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CASE NOTES
TORTS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES-JUSTICE SOUGHT
AND ALMOST ATTAINED
In October of 1963, Elise Lipsey consulted Dr. Gerald J. Menaker
concerning a lump on her left arm. The lump, on advice of Dr. Menaker,
was surgically removed at Michael Reese Hospital and a biopsy was per-
formed by the pathology department of the hospital. A report of non-
malignancy was returned. In March of 1966, Mrs. Lipsey again con-
sulted Dr. Menaker with a similar lump on her arm which was again
surgically removed in April of 1966. At the same time, Dr. Menaker ex-
cised a lesion from her left breast. A new pathology report revealed ma-
lignancy in both areas and the necessity of further surgery. In late April,
1966, Mrs. Lipsey underwent radical surgery for removal of her left breast,
shoulder, and arm at a New York hospital. A frozen section of the lump
removed in 1963 was examined by the New York hospital pathology de-
partment and pronounced to be malignant. On December 14, 1966,
Elise Lipsey brought suit against both Dr. Menaker and Michael Reese
Hospital alleging negligence for failure to diagnose her cancerous condi-
tion at the time of her first surgery. Defendant moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's action was barred by the appli-
cable Illinois two year statute of limitations. The Circuit Court of Cook
County granted defendant's motions and dismissed the complaint. On ap-
peal, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the Illinois statute of limita-
tions as limiting actions to two years from the discovery of the malprac-
tice in medical malpractice cases. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital 46
Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E. 2d 450 (1970).
The decision in the Lipsey case represents an advance in Illinois ju-
dicial thinking which is most necessary if the injustices which so often
occur in the area of malpractice litigation are to be eventually cured. The
purpose of this note is to give the reader: (1) A brief review of the con-
cept of the statute of limitations, its purposes, and the injustices which can
result from its strict application in the area of professional malpractice
(especially medical malpractice); (2) an historical review of Illinois' legis-
lative and judicial modifications and applications of the tort statute of lim-
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itations in malpractice cases culminating in the Lipsey decision;' (3) a
summary of the results reached by the legislatures and judiciaries of every
other state when confronted with injustices similar to those faced by the
Lipsey court; and (4) a recommendation for further action necessary to
relieve all injustice in the area of malpractice litigation. Since most mal-
practice litigation results from medical malpractice, most, though not all,
of the cases cited and/or discussed in this paper are of the medical mal-
practice variety. But the principles and rulings of these cases have ap-
plication, as will be seen, in all areas of professional malpractice.
A brief inspection of the codes or statutes of the various jurisdictions
within the United States reveals that every set of laws contains a section
which, though differently titled, has the effect of limiting the time in which
a court action may be brought for a wrong allegedly committed. This
time limit begins to run when the act which allegedly caused the injury or
damages occurs (in tort) or when the valid contract sued upon is breached.
The time limits often vary with the types of actions, i.e., often longer limits
exist for contract actions than for tort actions. Also, different states often
have different time limits for the same type of action. Nevertheless, some
time limit is always imposed.
The purpose for these limitations is clear. They exist to prevent the
presentation of "old and vexatious demands ' 2 and "fraudulent, false, frivo-
lous, speculative or uncertain claims."'3 This purpose is laudable and
ought to be preserved. But these limitations are imposed on broad cate-
gories of causes of action, such as torts, and the strict application of the
general tort statute of limitations to a specific kind of tort, such as the tort
of professional negligence (malpractice), often results in injustice to the
injured party.
For the purpose of example, suppose state XYZ has a two year tort
statute of limitations applicable to all torts. This may be an adequate
time limit in which to bring a tort action for automobile accident injuries,
assault and battery, or trespass. But is it an adequate time limit for one
who, unskilled in the craft of surveying, puts his trust in a professional sur-
veyor, and five years after a survey (three years after the statute of limi-
tations has passed), finds that, due to a negligent survey, part of his home
is on his neighbor's land? Is it an adequate time limit for one who, un-
skilled in the construction trade, puts his trust in a professional contractor
1. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital, 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).
2. Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 340-41, 199 N.E.2d
633, 636 (1964).
3. New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 425, 241 A.2d
633, 636 (1968).
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and, five years after his home is built and three years after the statute of
limitations has expired, finds that his home has collapsed due to faulty con-
struction? Was two years an adequate time limit for Mrs. Lipsey in the
cited case? Obviously, a strict application of the two year tort statute of
limitations of state XYZ would impose extreme hardship on Mrs. Lipsey
and the other two individuals. They would each possess a valid cause of
action for malpractice; but, since they did not discover or sustain actual
damage until after the statute of limitations had run, they have no
means of prosecuting their valid claims. The injustice of this "right with-
out a remedy"' 4 is apparent.
In Illinois, cases of professional malpractice, and their resulting injus-
tice, have confronted the courts since 1923. In that year the court de-
cided Treece v. Southern Gem Coal Corp.5 , an action for damages to
property resulting from the subsidence of the ground caused by the de-
fendant's failure to leave sufficient support after abandoning mining oper-
ations under the plaintiff's property. Though the court did not elaborate,
its ruling is clear-the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of
the subsidence (discovery of actual damage), not from the date of the re-
moval of the support (the act which allegedly caused the damage). The
basis for this ruling seems to rest solely in the logic of the Treece court,
since there was no legislation to this effect. It seems that the possible in-
justice to be suffered by the plaintiff was considered by the court and in-
fluenced its decision.
The problem of the possible application of a "discovery" rule arose in
1933 with the case of Madison v. Wedron Silica Company.6 In that case,
the plaintiff worked for defendant from 1924 to 1930, during which time
he contracted silicosis. The plaintiff claimed a violation of the Occupa-
tional Diseases Act. The defendant claimed that the standard two year
tort statute of limitations 7 applied. In its ruling, the court stated that its
ruling was based on logic and an humane (just) view of the law:
To say that the plaintiff must have filed suit at the time of the first inhalation of the
silica dust, means that an injury could not . . . be proved. Such argument is
unsound and does violence to the manifest intent of the legislature . . . . The
logical view is to consider the time when the employee is forced to quit work be-
cause of the cumulative effect of successive injuries resulting in final disablement
rather than the first inhalation or injury. This view is the liberal and humane one,
accomplishes the purposes of the act and carries out the intent of the legislature.8
4. Peterson, The Undiscovered Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitations:
A Right Without a Remedy in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 644 (1970).
5. 245 IlI. App. 113 (1923).
6. 352 Ill. 60, 184 N.E. 901 (1933).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1969).
8. Supra note 6, at 62, 184 N.E. at 902 (emphasis added).
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Apparently the legislature felt the logic espoused by the court was valid
because in 1937 it amended the Workmen's Occupational Disease Act to
include a statute of limitations which began to run on "disablement" (dis-
covery of illness).9 The discovery rule was thus again employed (but
here, not directly in a professional malpractice case).
The Illinois courts' next encounter with the statute of limitations in a
professional malpractice case was in 1943 with the case of Gangloff v.
Apfelbach.10 This case showed the hard line, strict application of the law
by a less liberal court and dealt primarily with the Illinois rejection of a
then popular view that the statue of limitations should be extended to two
years (or some other time period) after the termination of treatment by
the physician. Illinois flatly rejected this rule and applied its strict two
year tort statute of limitations from the date of the act causing the injury.
The court retained this strict view through 1964. In that year, the court
decided Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital." Here a needle was left in
the plaintiff's body during surgery performed in 1956. Subsequent sur-
gery in 1960 disclosed the needle and the substantial injury which it had
caused. The court held that the strict two year tort statute of limitations
applied and barred plaintiff's recovery when, in referring to the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act' 2 and Workmen's Occupational Disease
Act" (both of which have time limits which commence running on "dis-
covery" of injury or illness), it emphatically stated:
We must assume that the legislature acted deliberately in not extending the same
relief to malpractice cases as it did to cases of radiological injury and occupational
diseases. We can not do what the legislature has failed to do.14
The court was in fact saying it could not and would not relieve the glaring
injustice of the Mosby decision which resulted from the strict application
of the two year tort statute of limitations to a medical malpractice case
without formal legislative action in this area.
The next year the legislature, apparently noting the conservative court's
failure to rule without formal legislative sanction and, hopefully, noting the
injustice caused by the Mosby decision, revised the Illinois statute of limi-
tation" with regard to medical malpractice cases. It extended the period
of limitation to two years from the discovery of "any foreign substance"' 6
9. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.24 (1937).
10. 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943).
11. Supra note 2.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c)(3) (1969).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.41(c) (1969).
14. Supra note 2, at 342, 199 N.E.2d at 636 (emphasis added).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1969).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1969).
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left in the body. This legislative action had the effect of overturning
the law espoused in the Mosby decision and remedying the injustice inher-
ent in its strict application.
In 1967, the discovery rule was again rejected by the Illinois court, this
time in a case regarding the professional malpractice of contractors and
architects. In Simoniz Company v. J. Emil Anderson & Sons, Inc.,17 the
roof of the plaintiff's building collapsed nine years after completion of the
building and the collapse was caused by latent and undiscoverable defects
in design and construction of the building. The strict five year statute of
limitations was applied by the court' s and no action could be maintained
against the professionally negligent architects or contractors. This decision
seems harsh in light of 1967 Illinois legislation' 9 imposing a discovery type
statute of limitation for negligent work of surveyors. Are surveyors any
more or less "professional" than the contractors and architects protected
by the Simoniz20 case and, therefore, to be afforded so much less protec-
tion? From this judicial ruling and this legislative action, occurring in the
same year yet having opposite results in very similar areas, it is apparent
that the area of the statute of limitations applicable in professional mal-
practice cases (other than medical malpractice) is as yet not stable.
Hopefully, a uniformity resulting in justice for all parties in this type of
litigation is forthcoming in the not too distant future.
In 1969, the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice
cases was again before the court in the case of Mathis v. Hejna.2" Here
the plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent in allowing pantopaque,
a dye injected into the spinal canal during a myelography, to remain in the
body of the plaintiff and cause him to contract arachnoiditis. His injury
was discovered "within a period of less than two years preceding the date
this suit was commenced."' 22 The plaintiff contended that the new 1965
"discovery rule" statute of limitations, 23 enacted after the Mosby decision,
governed. In ruling for the plaintiff, the court demonstrated a liberal, pro-
gressive, and just attitude in this area:
If the legislature intended the statute to apply only to those cases in which sponges,
needles, clamps, and like items are negligently left in the body of a patient, ... they
17. 81 11. App. 2d 428, 225 N.E.2d 161 (1967).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1969).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24g (1969).
20. Supra note 17.
21. 109 Ill. App. 2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767 (1969).
22. Id. at 358, 248 N.E.2d at 768.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1969).
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would have chosen different wording to express that intent . . . We think the
facts, as pleaded, come within the technical definition of the statute as well as the
object and purpose of the statute. 24
With justice as its prime concern and almost fifty years of judicial and
legislative discussion on this and closely related matters as its guide, the
Lipsey court in the noted case had no trouble reaching its justice-seeking
decision:
[We] consider that the Limitations Act should not be given the narrow construction
. . . . Such a construction often brings "obvious and flagrant injustice." (Prosser,
Law of Tort, (3rd. ed. 1964), sec. 30). We extend the rule of time of discovery
• . . and hold that, in medical malpractice cases as this, the cause of action accrues
when the person injured learns of his injury or should reasonably have learned of it.25
With this decision, the Illinois court, with substantial assistance from the
Illinois legislature, has completely reversed its position on this type of case.
It has gone from the strictest, unwaivering, and often unjust application of
the two year tort statute of limitations, which began to run when the act
causing the injury occurred, through and past various intermediate stages,
to this final "discovery rule" where the statute of limitations in medical
malpractice cases begins to run when the injury is, or reasonably should
have been, "discovered." The law seeks justice and the Illinois courts have
finally established a just rule in medical malpractice cases.
The previous discussion dealt in depth with Illinois' encounters with this
difficult problem of the statute of limitations applicable to professional and
particularly medical malpractice cases. Every jurisdiction has established
time limits in which actions must be brought. Hence, it is only logical that
other jurisdictions have encountered the same problem. A review of the
results of these encounters would be helpful in seeing the trend of the vari-
ous courts in this area.
In the past, there seemed to be a great legislative reluctance to adopt the
"discovery rule" in medical malpractice cases. Prior to 1957, only one
state legislature (Alabama) 26 had formally adopted the discovery rule in
the case of medical malpractice. However, since 1957, three additional
jurisdictions have joined with Alabama and adopted the discovery rule
through legislative action--California,27 Connecticut, 2 and Oregon. 29 This
24. Supra note 21, at 361, 248 N.E.2d at 769-70.
25. Supra note 1, at 39, 262 N.E.2d at 455.
26. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (1960), as amended ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1)
(2) (Supp. 1969).
27. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 340.5 (Supp. 1971).
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1960), as amended CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1971).
29. ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 12.110 (1969).
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sudden surge of action on the part of legislatures may indicate a sudden
awareness on the part of legislatures of the injustice inherent in the appli-
cation of their old limitation laws to modem medical malpractice cases.
This legislative inaction in this area does not mean the judiciaries in the
various states have been equally inactive. In fact, the courts have recently
attacked this problem vigorously, lending various constructions to existing
statutes. Some thirteen jurisdictions30 have interpreted their individual
tort statutes of limitation to be of the "discovery rule" type for all cases
of medical malpractice (as in the Lipsey case). In ten other states, the
judiciaries have limited their "discovery rule" construction in medical mal-
practice cases" to cases where foreign objects are left in the body.32
Three states33 still cling to an old rule tolling the statutes of limitations until
the end of the physician-patient relationship. Two state judiciaries have
said the applicable statute of limitations begins to run in medical malprac-
tice cases when "a right to sue" 34 exists. Whether a right to sue exists
when the injury to the person becomes manifest by damages (similar to a
"discovery rule"), or exists when an act latently causing injury is done to
30. Arizona: Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897 (D. Ariz. 1967); Rodriquez
v. Manoil, 9 Az. A. 225, 450 P.2d 737 (1969); Florida: Vilord v. Jenkins, 226
So. 2d 245 (1969); Hawaii: Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Haw. 150, 433 P.2d
220 (1967); Iowa: Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967);
Louisiana: Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying Louisiana
law); Maryland: Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966);
Michigan: Winfrey v. Farhat, 382 Mich. 380, 170 N.W.2d 34 (1969); Nebraska:
Acker v. Sorensen, 183 Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969); New Jersey: Yerzy v.
Levine, 108 N.J. Sup. 222, 260 A.2d 533 (1970); North Dakota: Iverson v. Lan-
caster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (1968); Oklahoma: Lewis v. Owen, 395 F.2d 537 (10th
Cir. 1968) (applying Oklahoma law); Pennsylvania: Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410
Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267 (1963); Rhode Island: Wilkenson v. Harrington, 104
R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968).
31. Delaware: Layton v. Allen, - Del. -, 246 A.2d 794 (1968); District of
Columbia: Burke v. Washington Hospital Center, 293 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1968);
Idaho: Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 488, 389 P.2d 224 (1964);
Massachusetts: Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966);
Montana: Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967); New
York: Flanagan v. Mt. Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871,
301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Texas: Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Utah:
Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968); Washington: Ruth
v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969); West Virginia: Morgan v. Grace
Hospital Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
32. Identical interpretation of statute as codified in Illinois in 1965. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1969).
33. Indiana: Ostojic v. Brueckmann, 405 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1968) (applying
Indiana law); Minnesota: Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 180 N.W.2d 187
(1970); Missouri: Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1968).
34. Colorado: Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957); South
Carolina: Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962).
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the body (strict application) has not been adequately clarified by the re-
spective courts. The Ohio judiciary8 5 has its own rule. That court says
there is no cause of action in medical malpractice cases without injury-
hence, the statute of limitations begins to run when "consequential in-
jury" results.3 6  This rule seems very close to a simple "discovery rule"
since discovery usually does not take place until injury resulting from a neg-
ligent act is manifest.
From the foregoing, a marked trend in the various judiciaries is apparent.
Twenty-nine judiciaries have faced the problem of the statute of limitations
in medical malpractice cases and apparently have realized the injustice
in applying a strict statute of limitations and construed their existing stat-
utes so as to alleviate, to at least some extent, the hardships resulting from
a strict construction. However, eighteen 7 state judiciaries have taken no
such initiative when faced with the problem, and continue to impose the
strict statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases, often with very
harsh results. Fortunately, these states represent a continually shrinking
minority. 38
Medical malpractice cases have not been the only professional malprac-
tice cases where the various judiciaries have sought to eliminate the injus-
tice resulting from a strict application of tort statute of limitations. For
example, the courts of at least three states-Iowa, Maryland and Pennsyl-
vania-have established a "discovery rule" statute of limitations for pro-
fessional architectural malpractice.3 9  Additionally, Pennsylvania has ex-
hibited an even greater extension of the "discovery rule" in the case of Dan-
iels v. Beryllium Corporation.40 The plaintiff lived in the vicinity of the
defendant's plant and had been exposed to beryllium dust since prior to
World War II. She became ill in 1949 and, in 1953, her condition was
diagnosed as beryllium poisoning. The court held:
[tihat the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiffs, by the exercise
of reasonable diligence, could have discovered that the wife's condition was caused
by defendant's operations. 4 1
35. Cook v. Yager, 13 0. App. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 326 (1968).
36. Id. at 8, 233 N.E.2d at 331.
37. Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Hampshire (has a six year statute), New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
38. For a chart compilation of each state and its legislative and judicial hold-
ings in this area, see Appendix A.
39. Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967); Steelwork-
ers Holding Company v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440, 258 A.2d 177 (1969); Med-Mar,
Inc. v. Dilworth, 214 Pa. S.C. 402, 257 A.2d 910 (1969).
40. 227 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
41. Id. at 595.
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The question of the statute of limitations in legal malpractice was raised
in a very recent case, Denzer v. Rouse.42 Here, purchasers of real estate
sued the estate of an attorney for legal malpractice in negligently preparing
a deed in 1947. The negligent preparation was not discovered until 1966,
well past the applicable six year statute of limitations. The court ruled in
favor of their brother at the bar, stating:
Tolling of the statute of limitations in this state does not await the time or fact of
discovery. When negligence and resultant injury have occurred, the statute starts
to run . . . . It follows that the present action is barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 43
Such a decision is expected in a state where no discovery rule has been
applied. 44 But what if this case were decided in a "discovery rule" state
such as Pennsylvania or Maryland? 45  It would appear that the decision
may have been different.
These examples indicate what hopefully will be the rule and not the
exception in the future-an alleviation of injustice in the application of the
statute of limitations in all professional malpractice cases by the various
judiciaries. Such court rulings are obviously a necessary step in the alle-
viation of the stated injustice. But do these court rulings reach the ulti-
mate just result? A look at the examples previously used in this case note
(with a few alterations) will reveal the answer.
Take the example of the plaintiff who discovered his home was on his
neighbor's land five years after a negligent survey-assume the discovery
of the negligence was made thirty-five years after the survey. If the court
applied a full "discovery rule" in the application of the statute of limita-
tions in this professional malpractice case, the plaintiff could still bring his
action, since the malpractice (negligent survey) was not discovered until
thirty-five years after it was made. Is it fair or just to the defendant sur-
veyors to subject them to the fear of litigation for a thirty-five year period?
Quite probably his records are destroyed, he remembers nothing about this
particular survey, and therefore has no chance to defend this claim. If he
is recently deceased, it would be impossible for his estate to defend this
claim. Further, is it fair to the defendant to force him to bear the greatly
increased cost of professional liability insurance46 which would undoubtedly
result when the defendant's malpractice exposure is increased by thirty-
42. 48 Wisc. 2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970).
43. Id. at 533, 180 N.W.2d at 524.
44. Supra note 37.
45. Supra note 30.
46. Such insurance is almost always bought by professionals to protect them-
selves in the event of a claim against them for professional negligence.
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three years? If, in the second example, thirty-five years had elapsed from
the construction of the plaintiff's building to its collapse due to the negligent
construction, would it be fair to the defendant contractor to allow a suit on
this case? Again, any records, blueprints, or personal knowledge of the
specific job are long lost, and the defendant has little or no hope of de-
fending this action. Also, his cash expenditure for professional liability in-
surance might be prohibitive. In the cited case, if it were medically pos-
sible for Mrs. Lipsey to discover Dr. Menaker's and Michael Reese
Hospital's negligence thirty years after her initial diagnosis, would it be fair
to both defendants to allow a suit after thirty years? Lack of records, per-
sonal knowledge, and loss of possible witnesses make defense of this case
impossible. This increased exposure would also increase the already astro-
nomical cost of medical malpractice insurance by substantial amounts.
Thus, where prior strict application of the tort statute of limitations resulted
in grave injustice to many plaintiffs, present liberal, unrestrictive applica-
tion of a "discovery" type statute of limitations could result in grave injus-
tice to many professional defendants. Unfortunately, it is these injustices
which result from these two extreme applications of a law by the judiciary.
In no case where the "discovery rule" has been employed has an outside
time limit been set by a court to alleviate injustice to a defendant, and
rightly so. The judicial branch of the government can not do the job of the
legislative branch. The courts may recommend, but, at least in theory,
they can not make or change laws. This duty belongs to the legislature
and the various legislatures must do their duties by acting in this area. To
insure justice to all litigants, legislatures must not only formally adopt the
"discovery" type statutes of limitations in professional malpractice cases to
protect the plaintiffs, as the courts have espoused, but also must set a
maximum time limit for instituting such actions to protect defendants. In
essence, what is required is the establishment of a time limit in which an
action may be brought-a statute of limitation-but this time limit must
be extended to more than the standard tort time limit in malpractice cases
where non-discovery of an injury for long periods of time is possible.
With the requirement for justice thus isolated, the only problem to be
resolved is what time limit is just for both parties. A review of the statutes
of limitations of the four states adopting discovery rules for medical mal-
practice cases will reveal their feelings as to a just time limit.
The California statute4 7 is the most recent. It provides for a four year
limit from date of injury, or one year from discovery by use of reasonable
diligence, whichever first occurs. This statute allows, then, the longest pos-
47. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 340.5 (Supp. 1971).
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sible extension of the statute of limitations to be four years. Connecticut's
statute 48 affords even less time-two years from date of injury or two years
from date discovered using reasonable care but not longer than three years
from the date of the act causing the injury. Alabama 49 affords two years
from the date of the act unless undiscovered; then six months from the date
of discovery, but no more than six years from the date of the act causing the
injury. Oregon's statute5" succinctly says two years from the discovery of
the negligence, but never more than seven years from the act causing the in-
jury. The Illinois statute5' enacted in 1965, subsequent to the Mosby deci-
sion (though of a limited "discovery" type), allows a two year statute of
limitations from date of discovery of a foreign substance in the body, but
never more than ten years after the negligent operation or treatment.
As can be seen, all five of these statutes have a time limit in which to
bring an action after the cause of action is discovered. This limit varies
but in all cases has the effect of preventing a plaintiff from delaying the fil-
ing of his suit till long after the discovery of his claim so as to take advan-
tage of a change in the defendant's circumstances-such as the defendant's
death or senility-which would make the case harder for the defendant to
defend. This type of provision gives a little added protection to the defend-
ant but takes nothing from the plaintiff or his case. But the maximum time
limit provision of each statute is of greater concern. Does the three year
maximum limit allowed by Connecticut afford a just time limit for an un-
knowing plaintiff to discover and bring an action? Is California's four
years a sufficiently just time for a similarly situated plaintiff? Is Illinois'
ten year maximum limit fair and just to a defendant? In light of the types
of injustices suffered by the litigants from the different (strict or "discov-
ery") applications of the exisiting statutes of limitation, it seems that Illi-
nois' maximum time limit, proposed in its limited legislation in this area, af-
fords both parties sufficient protection and equal justice. It affords justice
to the defendant in three ways: ten years is not an unreasonably long time
to keep records; availability of possible defense witnesses is greatest in the
years immediately following an occurrence but is usually nonexistent after
ten years; and, though the costs of professional liability insurance will in-
crease with the increased exposure, at least a time limit exists which limits a
defendant's liability and with which actuaries may work to compute the in-
surance premiums. It is just for the plaintiff in that, though a few injuries
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1960), as amended CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1971).
49. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (1960).
50. ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 12.110 (1969).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1969).
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or damages may remain latent and undiscovered for more than ten years,
most injuries or damages will become at least partially manifest within ten
years of the act allegedly causing them and hence give warning of the exist-
ence of a possible cause of action to the plaintiff within a ten year period.
Thus, a well drafted legislative change in this area including a ten year
maximum time limit in conjunction with the other previously mentioned
provision would eliminate most, if not all, of the injustice possibly resulting
from various applications of the statute of limitations to professional mal-
practice cases. However, in some specific types of professional malprac-
tice cases, in which records of professional action are'kept by official agen-
cies (such as surveys kept by the Recorder of Deeds of Cook County), the
legislature might consider a longer time limit since one injustice imposed
previously on the defendant-that of impossible record keeping-has been
eliminated. 52 In any event, the legislature must act in this area to extend
the. time limit beyond its present unjust time and yet limit it so as to pre-
vent unjust limitless claims.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Lipsey case in Illinois was a
necessary step in the overall endeavor to relieve the injustice which re-
sulted to the plaintiff from the strict application of the statute of limitations
in medical malpractice cases. Similar injustices are occurring in other
areas of professional malpractice and are being dealt with in similar ways
in Illinois and other jurisdictions. But the action in these other areas is
not nearly as fast and direct as in the area of medical malpractice. With
judicial pronouncements such as in the Lipsey case as a spur, hopefully
the legislative action necessary to prevent all injustice in medical malprac-
tice cases will be taken in every legislature as it has already been taken in
Alabama, California, Connecticut, and Oregon. From there, application
of these new laws to all areas of professional malpractice is an easy step.
Philip F. Ignarski
52. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24g (1969).
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APPENDIX A
Present rule in each state as
medical malpractice actions.
STATE A
Alabama X
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California X
Colorado
Connecticut X
Delaware
Dist. of Col.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon X
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
to the statute of limitations applicable in
B C D E F
X
X
X
X
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APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
STATE A B C D E F
Texas X
Utah X
Vermont X
Virginia X
Washington X
West Virginia X
Wisconsin X
Wyoming X
Column A = Specific statute applies.
B = Discovery rule adopted by case law for ALL medical malpractice.
C = Discovery rule adopted by case law for OBJECTS left in the body.
D = Statute commences at the termination of the physician/patient re-
lationship.
E = Statute commences when "right to sue" exists.
F = No discovery rule adopted-strict application of existing tort statutes
of limitations.
